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Abstract
Nearly all Internet services rely on the Domain Name
System (DNS) to resolve human-readable names to IP ad-
dresses. However, the content of DNS queries and responses
can reveal private information, from the websites that a user
visits to the types of devices on a network. Industry and
researchers have responded in recent years to the inherent
privacy risks of DNS information, focusing on tunneling
DNS traffic over encrypted transport and application proto-
cols. One such mechanism, DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) places
DNS functionality directly in the web browser itself to direct
DNS queries to a trusted recursive resolver (resolver) over
encrypted HTTPS connections. The DoH architecture solves
privacy risks (e.g., eavesdropping) but introduces new con-
cerns, including those associated with the centralization of
DNS queries to the operator of a single recursive resolver that
is selected by the browser vendor. It also introduces potential
performance problems: if a client’s resolver is not proximal
to the content delivery network that ultimately serves the
content, the CDN may fail to optimally localize the client. In
this paper, we revisit the trend towards centralized DNS and
explore re-decentralizing the critical Internet protocol, such
that clients might leverage multiple DNS resolvers when re-
solving domain names and retrieving content. We propose
and evaluate several candidate decentralized architectures,
laying the groundwork for future research to explore decen-
tralized, encrypted DNS architectures that strike a balance
between privacy and performance.
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) serves the essential func-
tion of mapping human-readable names to IP addresses and
is central to the operation of most Internet services. DNS is
nearly 40 years old, and until recently DNS queries and re-
sponses have not been encrypted. Recent concerns over user
privacy, however, have focused attention on the DNS and the
various privacy risks associated with being able to observe
DNS queries and responses. For example, DNS queries can
reveal the websites (and webpages) that a user is visiting,
the connected devices they own, and even how they inter-
act with those devices in the physical world. Because DNS
queries and responses have generally been transmitted in
the clear, any entity who can observe the DNS could also
gain insight into a wealth of private information about an
individual.
In light of these concerns, recent proposals to encrypt
DNS queries and responses have emerged, including trans-
mitting DNS queries and responses over Transport Layer
Security (DNS-over-TLS, or DoT) and Secure HTTP (DNS-
over-HTTPS, or DoH). One approach to deployment has
been to configure a client device with a single, recursive
resolver that is responsible for terminating the encrypted
communications channel and resolving all of the client’s
DNS queries. In the case of Mozilla’s Firefox browser, this re-
solver is called a trusted recursive resolver (TRR). In the case
of DoT, the client software might be the operating system
(e.g., the Android OS has a “private DNS” option that routes
all DNS traffic to Google’s DoT resolver) or a browser (e.g.,
the Firefox browser has an option to enable DoH that results
in all DNS traffic being exchanged with Cloudflare). These ar-
chitectures cause all of a client’s DNS traffic to be exchanged
with a single entity, even as that client changes networks
and physical locations, potentially introducing new privacy
and reliability concerns.
Yet, encrypting DNS should not require centralizing it. In
fact, as operating systems and browsers move to encrypt
DNS, we are witnessing a proliferation of resolvers, run by a
variety of independent entities. Distributing encrypted DNS
queries across these resolvers could preserve the confidential-
ity benefits of encrypting DNS traffic without introducing
new reliability and privacy concerns that would arise from
centralizing it. Distributed resolvers, operated by indepen-
dent organizations, can allow clients to achieve the privacy
benefits of encrypting the DNS while also avoiding the risks
of centralizing it.
Distributing DNS queries across multiple resolvers has
the potential to avoid privacy and reliability risks associ-
ated with centralization, the central question is how to do so.
In particular, relying on multiple resolvers to resolve DNS
queries requires a strategy for directing each DNS query to
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an appropriate resolver; different choices have implications
for both privacy and performance. This paper does not aim to
provide the final word on the “best” strategy for distributing
DNS queries across resolvers; rather, we aim to show that
doing so is possible architecturally, to show that there are
many feasible strategies for doing so that involve tradeoffs
between privacy and performance, and to take a first step
towards quantifying the performance tradeoffs of different
resolver selection strategies.
We evaluate several different resolver selection strategies:
(1) randomly distributing queries for DNS domain names
across a set of proximal resolvers; (2) sending DNS queries
to the resolver associated with the content delivery network
that is ultimately responsible for serving the associated web
objects. Both of these strategies offer different privacy bene-
fits: random assignment ensures that no single entity amasses
extensive information about a client’s DNS query patterns,
and assignment based on CDN affinity ensures that a CDN
who operates a resolver learns no additional information
about the domains that a client is visiting (since it must
serve the associated objects, in any case).
An open question, however, is the effects of these strate-
gies on performance, particularly on page load time. Of par-
ticular concern is the effects of these strategies on the ability
of a CDN to localize clients: specifically, sending DNS queries
through a resolver that is not proximal to the client may af-
fect client localization and thus the ability of a CDN to map
the client to a nearby CDN cache node, thus inhibiting page
loads. On the other hand, a CDN that both resolves DNS
names and serves the associated objects may be able to bet-
ter localize clients for those objects, and might even be able
to proactively resolve DNS queries associated with future
object requests. Our goal in this paper is to explore the per-
formance implications of these two different architectures.
In both cases, we compare web page load times against the
baseline architectures of relying on a single trusted resolver,
and against default DNS lookups.
To measure these effects, we instrumented Mozilla Firefox
to resolve DNS queries using each of the above strategies
and measured the corresponding page load times for each
resolver selection strategy. Randomly selecting a proximal
resolver for each domain name to resolve results in a median
performance loss of tens of milliseconds versus simply using
the default local resolver, suggesting a marginal performance
loss for corresponding potential privacy benefits. Alterna-
tively, sending DNS queries to a resolver that is co-located
with the CDN that hosts the corresponding objects yields
a median improvement in page load time of more than 100
milliseconds for both Google and Cloudflare. In this paper,
we focus on the performance effects of different selection
strategies, using unencrypted DNS as the baseline for com-
parison.
This paper explores the architectural feasibility and per-
formance implications of different strategies for distributing
DNS queries across resolvers. It is, however, far from the last
word on architectures and strategies for distributing DNS
queries. First, although we evaluate two possible strategies
for distributing DNS, many others are possible. Second, to
facilitate browser-based measurements, we focus on the per-
formance effects of distributing unencrypted DNS queries
across resolvers; future work could extend this study to per-
form similar measurements with DoT and DoH as browser
and device support for these protocols become more preva-
lent. To encourage the reproducibility of our study and fa-
cilitate these extensions to our work, we have released our
complete test harness and measurements to the community.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide background on recent develop-
ments in DNS encryption—specifically DNS-over-TLS and
DNS-over-HTTPS—as well as related previous work explor-
ing the relationships between DNS and performance.
2.1 Current Trends in DNS Centralization
The Domain Name System (DNS) resolves human-
readable domain names to IP addresses [15]. When a client
application needs to resolve a domain name, its stub resolver
typically issues a recursive DNS query to a local recursive
resolver. Often, a client’s local recursive resolver is automat-
ically configured at the same time as when it receives its
IP address on the local network (e.g., using a configuration
protocol such as the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol,
or DHCP). The local recursive resolver will either have the
answer for the query cached (i.e., from a previous query), or
it will perform a sequence of “iterative” queries to authori-
tative name servers to resolve the domain name, cache the
resulting response, and return the response to the client.
DNS queries and responses have historically been unen-
crypted, which has garnered increasing concern in recent
years, given various demonstrations that DNS traffic can be
used to discover private information about users, ranging
from the websites and webpages that they visit to the “smart”
devices that they use (and how they operate them). Signif-
icant concern has been raised, for example, by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) over an Internet service
provider’s ability to observe their subscribers DNS traffic. A
more common threat scenario, however, may be that of a
user who associates to a wireless network for convenience
(e.g., in a coffee shop, airport, or any public space) and sub-
sequently sends DNS queries to an associated DNS resolver,
in cleartext [3].
Increasing concern over these scenarios has led to vari-
ous developments to encrypt DNS queries and responses.
Two such developments are DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [10] and
DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [8]. Many DNS services, including
Google, Cloudflare, Quad9, and others now provide services
for both DoT and DoH. The challenge, naturally, concerns
configuring clients to use these protocols. Recent propos-
als from Mozilla and Google involve sending DoH queries
directly from the browser to a “trusted” recursive resolver (re-
solver) as configured in the browser (perhaps even by de-
fault, although as of this writing the default settings have
not yet changed). Similarly, the Android OS makes it possi-
ble to route all DNS queries via DoT to a Google-operated
resolver [13].
To date, however, clients that are configured to use DoT
or DoH operate using centralized architectures, whereby the
client sends all DoT or DoH queries to a single recursive
resolver. Such an architecture solves one privacy problem
but creates a new one—that of a single entity who now sees
all DNS queries for a user, from all devices, for all networks
and locations. In this sense, existing DoT and DoH architec-
tures have not solved any privacy problem—they have simply
moved the problem elsewhere, from one Internet entity (the
ISP) to another (a content provider, ad network, etc.).
Furthermore, existing DoH and DoT architectures have
introduced new performance concerns, since many CDNs
map clients to nearby web caches based on the location of
the client’s recursive resolver. Of course, if the CDN operator
and the resolver operator are the same party (as may be the
case for certain objects, in the case of Cloudflare and Google),
this concern is somewhat mitigated, because the DNS opera-
tor sees the client’s IP address in any case. In cases where
the CDN does not operate the resolver, however, there are
some concerns that performance may suffer, if the CDN mis-
takenly maps a client to a cache based on the location of the
resolver that is not located within client’s ISP. These relative
performance effects have not been studied extensively in the
context of various DoH and DoT architectures, which is one
of the aims of our study.
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we compare to related work on architec-
tural changes to DNS, and we discuss related work on how
DNS affects web performance.
DNS Privacy Schmitt et al. proposed Oblivious DNS, a new
architecture that prevents recursive resolvers from associat-
ing queries with the clients that issue them [22]. ODNS does
not require changes to recursive resolvers or authoritative
servers, but the original design proposal does not involve
distributed recursive resolvers. Pauly et al. proposed Adap-
tive DNS as a method to enable clients to send encrypted
DNS queries to cloud-based resolvers and send queries for
private domain names to local resolvers [12]. In Adaptive
DNS, queries are selectively distributed to multiple resolvers;
there have been no studies of the performance of Adaptive
DNS.
DNS and Web Performance Sundaresan et al. [24] mea-
sured and identified performance bottlenecks for web page
load time in broadband access networks and found that page
load times are influenced by slow DNS response times and
can be improved by prefetching. An important distinction is
that they define the DNS response time only as the response
time for the first domain, while we consider the set of unique
fully qualified domain names of all resources contained in
a page. They investigate only nine high-profile websites,
which stands in contrast to the 2,000 popular and normal
websites that we analyze, and they estimate page load times
through Mirage and validate their findings through a head-
less browser PhantomJS, while we utilize Mozilla Firefox,
which is a full browser.
Wang et al. [26] introduced WProf, a profiling tool to
analyze page load performance. They identified that DNS
queries—in particular uncached, cold queries—can signifi-
cantly affect web performance, accounting for up to 13% of
the critical path delay for page load times. In 2012, Otto et
al. [18] found that CDN performance was negatively affected
when clients choose recursive resolvers that were geograph-
ically separated from CDN caches. We believe that this was
due to the fact that resolvers did not support ECS at the time
(ECS was only introduced in January 2011, and standardized
in May 2016) and CDNs only slowly started adopting any-
cast. Therefore, clients were likely redirected to sub-optimal
data center based on the resolver’s address, instead of the
client’s address. We suspect that with the wide-spread adop-
tion of ECS and anycast since 2012, CDN performance may
not be as negatively affected by choosing a resolver that is
geographically far away from a CDN.
Otto et al. introduced namehelp, a DNS proxy running on
a client’s machine that improves web performance [19]. It
is designed to help CDNs more accurately map clients to
CDN-hosted content. First, the client queries their config-
ured recursive resolver for a domain name. When the client
receives a DNS response from a recursive resolver, the proxy
checks if there is a CNAME indicating that the query was
re-directed to a CDN. If so, the proxy queries the recursive
resolver to look up the authoritative server for the CNAME.
The proxy finished by directly querying the authoritative
server for the CNAME, which is operated by the CDN. This
enables the CDN to directly use the client’s IP address to
map the client to nearby servers, rather than relying on the
recursive resolver, which may improve page load times. How-
ever, if the CNAME’s authoritative server is not already the
client’s cache, then namehelp induces additional delay in DNS
resolution times.
3 D-DNS: Re-Decentralizing DNS
In this section, we present various approaches for dis-
tributing DNS queries from clients across sets of recursive
resolvers. We explore two different approaches: (1) the client
sends queries for each DNS domain name to a random re-
solver (Section 3.1); and (2) the client sends DNS queries
to the resolver for the primary content delivery network
corresponding to the website and associated objects for that
site, all other DNS queries to the client’s default local re-
solver (Section 3.2). In this section, we focus on describing
the different strategies for decentralizing DNS queries across
multiple resolvers; Section 4.1 describes in more detail how
we implemented these strategies.
3.1 Random Distribution
A simple approach to distributing DNS queries across
resolvers is to send each DNS query to a random resolver. By
randomly distributing n queries toK multiple resolvers, each
resolver receives n/K of the queries on average, in theory
limiting the amount of information that any single entity
learns from a client’s DNS queries. This approach is also easy
to implement and can be deployed at a web browser, a stub
resolver, or a DNS forwarder.
The random distribution we implement assigns each do-
main name to a resolver that is randomly selected from a
pre-defined list. Queries for each domain are thus routed to
a different randomly selected resolver. dnsmasq in principle
allows all queries from a given 2LD to be routed to the same
resolver, which could potentially result in fewer cache misses
for authoritative DNS servers; on the other hand, different
subdomains could be managed by different entities, and for
simplicity of implementation we simply assigned each do-
main name from a complete list of objects corresponding to
a corpus of websites for this study (i.e., the top 100 websites
from the Tranco top list, as described in Section 4.1) to a
different resolver.
There are other ways to distribute DNS queries randomly
across a resolver that could be explored further. For example,
another approach would be to map all subdomains of a 2LD
to the same resolver, rather than distributing all subdomains
randomly across resolvers [2]. Hoang et al. evaluate DNS
performance using such an approach as well as how many
unique domain names get mapped to each resolver with
various sets of websites that a user may visit [7].
3.2 CDN-Based Distribution
Much web content is hosted by content delivery networks
(CDNs), which use the DNS to assign clients to nearby repli-
cas of the web content. CDNs map queries for content to
nearby cache nodes that host the content, relying on the
location of the client’s recursive resolver to map the client to
Figure 1: CDN-Based Distribution.
a nearby cache. A prominent concern with various propos-
als for DoH and DoT is that the resolver that a client uses
may not be close to the client, thus causing the client to be
mapped to a copy of the content that is far from the client it-
self. Increasingly, however, some CDNs, including Cloudflare
and Google, are hosting their own resolvers, which mitigates
this problem, since they could then see the queries and the
corresponding IP address of the client—thus allowing the
CDN to map the client’s location directly.
CDNs are increasingly hosting resolvers, with the assumed
approach being that a client would send all of its DNS queries
to that single entity, regardless of whether the CDN hosted
the corresponding content. Such an approach would cer-
tainly facilitate encrypted DNS transport (e.g., via DoH), but
it would also result in potential privacy leaks: the CDN oper-
ator would come to learn of DNS lookups for objects, devices,
and other activities that are not associated with the content
that it is serving to the client. An alternative approach, which
we call the Single CDN distribution, is to direct only the DNS
queries that are associated with the CDN-hosted content to
the CDN’s resolver; the client sends all other DNS queries
to the client’s local recursive resolver. Figure 1 shows the
step-by-step operation of this approach. Our hypothesis is
that such a approach could improve performance over both a
baseline approach of sending all queries to the local resolver,
and the random approach (Section 3.1), since the CDN that
hosts the object would learn the location of the client from
the queries it sends directly to the resolver. On the other
hand, the approach has better privacy properties that simply
directing all queries to a single CDN’s resolver, since the
CDN does not come to learn about DNS queries for which
it is already serving content. In this sense, this approach re-
sults in no additional information leakage about the client’s
browsing behavior to the CDN, since any information the
CDN operator learns about the client’s behavior from the
DNS queries is already would already learn by serving the
corresponding objects. On the other hand, DNS queries that
the client would have otherwise sent to an ISP resolver and
encrypted and sent to the CDN, thus resulting in an overall
reduction in information that is leaked via DNS queries.
The Single CDN approach is more complicated to imple-
ment since it requires the client to distribute queries to de-
termine which queries to resolve at the resolver correspond-
ing to the CDN-hosted objects. This approach essentially
requires each domain name to be resolved in advance to
determine which names resolve to objects that are hosted on
the CDN. To do so, we sent queries for all names to a recur-
sive resolver and subsequently performed a WHOIS/RDAP
lookup on the addresses that are returned to determine the
organization that owns each corresponding IP address. (This
initial mapping need only occur once; subsequent lookups
can be sent directly to the CDN’s resolver, as appropriate.)
Although our approach to determining the mapping be-
tween domain names and CDNs is cumbersome, in-progress
Internet drafts, including one authored by Cloudflare, aim
to streamline this process in the future. In particular, the
standard would allow a CDN to specify to clients which re-
solvers should be used for each object on a page [21], thus
allowing clients to know in advance which domain names
have content that is hosted by a CDN; this information could
then be incorporated directly into a DNS forwarder such
as dnsmasq. The draft has not yet been adopted by an IETF
working group, however, and its status is thus somewhat
unclear, especially in light of various security and privacy
risks associated with the approach. It nonetheless offers a
glimpse of how future Internet architectures might enable
the approach we are proposing.
4 How Does D-DNS Affect Performance?
In this section, we describe our results for page load times
and query response times, and we compare the network dis-
tance to CDN-hosted content when the CDN-based approach
and the local resolver were used. We performed our measure-
ments between February 4th, 2020 and February 7th, 2020.
Page loads and DNS measurements were performed back to
back, and we did not introduce delay between successive
measurements.
4.1 Experiment Design
Following, we describe the methodology underlying our
experiments to measure how D-DNS approaches affect web
performance. We first define the performance metrics and
explain how we measure them, and we then describe our
experiment setup and the limitations of our measurements.
Recursor Min. Avg. Max. Stdev.
Local Resolver 0.30 0.46 1.68 0.08
Quad9 2.24 2.99 5.80 0.21
Google 2.56 3.00 8.00 0.20
OpenDNS 2.44 3.16 7.77 0.22
Cloudflare 4.23 4.93 12.35 0.21
Table 1: Latencies (in milliseconds) for each recursive resolver, sorted
by increasing average latency. We performed approximately 15,650
measurements to each resolver.
4.1.1 Metrics
To understand how different distribution approaches affect
web performance, we measure page load times, DNS resolu-
tion times, and object download times. We also analyze the
effectiveness of the CDN-based approach by measuring the
network distance to servers that host CDN content.
Page Load Time We measure page load times of a website
through a full browser, Mozilla Firefox 67.0.4, which we use
in headless mode controlled by Selenium to record HTTP
Archive objects (HARs) [25]. In particular, the HAR contains
the onLoad timing, which measures the elapsed time between
when a page load began to when the load event was fired.
The load event is fired when a web page and all of its re-
sources have completely loaded. It is specified in the HTML
Living Standard and it is available in all major browser ven-
dors [17]. In fact, it has also been used to measure page
load times in previous research on web performance [4, 6].
A related event is DOMContentLoaded, which is fired when a
web page’s markup (HTML) has been completely loaded
and parsed by the browser. Unlike the load event, the
DOMContentLoaded event does not include the time for down-
loading and rendering each object on a web page. However,
including this time is necessary to truly understand how
selection of recursive resolvers affects page load times [16].
An alternative metric to page load time would be above-
the-fold rendering time (AFT), which measures the time it
takes to download and render content that is initially view-
able. The motivation for measuring AFT is that users may
perceive a page load to have finished before all the objects
have actually been rendered. However, accurately measuring
AFT is challenging: We would need to record the start time
and end time of rendering within the browser’s dimensions
for each page load [23], which would require invasive modi-
fications to the browser, which themselves could negatively
affect true rendering times, or we would need to visually
record the full rendering process and analyzing the recorded
video, which is prohibitively expensive. Moreover, although
the AFT might indicate that a browser has finished loading
the page, a user may not be able to interact with it yet, and
may not actually perceive the websites as having loaded.
Correspondingly, we rely on page load time (time of load
event) for our measurements.
DNS Query Response Time We measure unencrypted
DNS-over-UDP (which we define as Do53) query response
times by using a custom tool developed by Hounsel et al. [9].
It uses the getdns C library to issue Do53 queries after each
page load has completed. For each unique domain name con-
tained in a HAR that we recorded, we query the resolvers of
the approach with which we performed the page load and
we record the query response times for all domains.
The HARs we collect also contain response times for each
DNS query that was issued during the page load. However,
as Hounsel et al. discovered, the HAR response times may be
inaccurate depending on how the page load was performed.
For example, the initial query in a HAR can have a response
time of 0 ms, even in cases where this is impossible because
the session started with an empty cache and the latency to
the recursive resolver is larger. This can be the case because,
depending on how a website issues HTTP redirects, the
first query in the HAR is not actually the first query that
the browser performed. Instead, the browser might have
performed a variety of other HTTP requests and DNS queries
before, which may still be in-progress or already cached.
Therefore, to ensure that the response times are accurate,
we perform DNS queries after the page load has completed
through the custom tool.
NetworkDistance We hypothesize that the CDN approach
will improve performance for CDN-hosted content because
the CDN’s resolver will be able to better locate clients to
edge servers that host the content. For example, it could
easily take into consideration caching at the edge, network
capacity, or compute capacity. Therefore, in addition to page
load times and DNS response times, we also evaluate the
approaches by measuring how close CDN-hosted content
is to the client when the CDN approach is used and when
the local resolver is used. Specifically, we measure latency to
the IP addresses of CDN-hosted resources returned by the
recursive resolvers to represent network distance.
4.1.2 Resolvers and Web Pages
To understand the performance impact of D-DNS, we
design an experiment to load web pages with various ap-
proaches and recursive resolvers. In this section, we de-
scribe our choices of approaches, recursive resolvers, and
web pages, and we detail the hardware and software config-
uration we run our experiments on.
Recursive Resolvers We measure two approaches of how
D-DNS could be used: The random approach and the CDN-
based approach (Section 3). As a baseline comparison, we
also analyze how the local recursive resolver provided by
the university network from which we conduct our measure-
ments performs. For the CDN-based approaches, we analyze
content hosted by Cloudflare and Google, and we thus use
recursive resolvers operated by them (1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8
respectively). For the random approach, we use four popu-
lar recursive resolvers, namely Cloudflare (1.1.1.1), Google
(8.8.8.8), Quad9 (9.9.9.9), OpenDNS (208.67.222.222), and
the network’s local recursive resolver.
To construct the approaches, we use HARs of websites that
we collected for a previous study (see Section 4.1.2 for details),
andwe extract all unique domains from them. For the random
approach, we randomly assign each unique domain name to
one of the five recursive resolvers. For the CDN approach,
we assign the domain names for CDN-hosted objects to the
resolver operated by the respective CDN, and we use the
local recursive resolver for all other objects. For the baseline
comparison, we perform all queries with the local resolver.
These approaches do not depend on any particular DNS
protocol (encrypted or otherwise). As such, it is possible to
configure these approaches with DoH, a new protocol that
encrypts DNS requests and responses [8, 10]. This may en-
able clients to not only observe a performance benefit but
also improve their privacy. In fact, taking into account the
concept made popular by DoH, that is, “applications doing
DNS,” D-DNS approaches could be constructed and deployed
easily to end-users, as well as regularly optimized and easily
updated. However, DoH is not natively supported by Debian
and it would require substantial engineering effort to per-
form the measurement through the DoH client of Mozilla
Firefox itself, which is why we use Do53 to resolve names.
Web Pages We conduct our measurements with all three
approaches (random approach, CDN approach, and local re-
solver) for two different lists of websites. First, we select the
top 100 websites in the Tranco Top 1,000 list that use the
most content hosted by Cloudflare [20]. Second, we select
top 100 websites in the Tranco Top 1,000 list that use the
most content hosted by Google. This enables us to under-
stand if each approach performs differently with different
sets of CDN-hosted websites. We focus on popular websites
because users are more likely to visit them and thus experi-
ence performance benefits.
We determine if a website uses CDN-hosted content by
analyzing the IP addresses of all resources contained in HARs
we collected for an earlier study for the Tranco Top 1,000
websites.We then perform RDAP lookups on the IP addresses
and mark them as CDN-hosted if Cloudflare or Google are
in the organization field [11].
4.1.3 Experiment Setup
We perform our experiments on a desktop-class computer
comprised of an 8th Generation Intel Core i7 CPU and 32 GiB
of memory, and running Debian stable (buster). The machine
is connected over Gigabit Ethernet to the university net-
work, and it runs our measurement suite to collect page load
times and DNS response times. To deploy our measurement
suite, we use a Docker container that enables us to clear
local HTTP and DNS caches between each page load eas-
ily. Moreover, to enable reproducibility of our research and
further open science, we will make our measurement suite,
including the Docker container, publicly available at the time
of publication. We use dnsmasq to implement our approaches,
which is a DNS forwarder that runs on our local machine.
We configure dnsmasq in such a away that queries are di-
rected to different recursive resolvers based on their domain
name. For example, we redirect all queries to google.com to
Google’s recursive resolver 8.8.8.8. As such, we create a
dnsmasq configuration file with each approach for each list
of websites.
This design has some limitations that may affect the gen-
eralization of our results. Our measurement’s generalization
is limited in two ways: First, we perform our measurements
exclusively on the Debian operating system, which is based
on Linux, which means that Linux’s networking stack and
parameters for networking algorithms will affect our mea-
surements. Networking stacks are heavily optimized though,
which is why we expect our results to generalize across op-
erating systems. Second, we conduct our experiments from
a single computer connected to a university network, which
means that we cannot easily generalize our results across
other machines or other networks, like residential ISPs. How-
ever, the machine fromwhich we perform our measurements
is representative of an end-user computer. Furthermore, uni-
versity networks are typically very well connected, which
means that any improvements we can observe on a univer-
sity network are likely going to be a lower-bound in terms of
potential performance improvements for end-users relying
on a residential ISP for network connectivity.
4.2 Decentralization Strategies are Feasible
As DNS queries for CDN-hosted content are issued to dif-
ferent recursive resolvers, clients can get mapped to different
edge servers. Accordingly, depending on which approaches
are used, clients may be able to download CDN objects more
quickly. In turn, a browser can parse and render these objects
earlier, and we expect that the CDN approach will cause page
load times to be lower than with the local resolver. We also
expect the random approach to perform similar to the local
resolver. We study page load times across our approaches
for each set of websites (Section 4.1.2).
Figure 3 shows CDFs for differences in page load times
between approaches with the websites that use the most
Cloudflare-hosted or Google-hosted resources. The vertical
line on each subplot indicates the median for the CDF. A
median that is less than 0s on the x-axis is indicated in blue
hues and means that the approach on the left half of the
caption is faster than the approach specified by the right of
the caption. Correspondingly, a median that is greater than
0s on the x-axis is indicated in red hues and means that the
approach specified by the left half of the caption is slower
than the approach specified by the right half of the caption.
Finally, a median that is close to 0s (between -30ms and 30ms,
that is approximately one frame when the page is rendered
at 30Hz, or two frames when the page is rendered at 60Hz)
indicates that the two approaches perform similarly.
We find that the CDN approach outperforms the local
resolver in terms of page load times for the webpages that
include the most Cloudflare-hosted resources. The median
difference in page load times between the CDN approach
and the local resolver is 47ms. This improvement is intuitive:
The CDN provider can point us to the best place to fetch the
objects from based on edge server utilization and network
conditions, among other metrics. Interestingly, we also find
that page loads with the random approach are faster than
with the local resolver, with amedian difference of 33ms. This
may seem counter-intuitive at first given that distributing
queries to multiple recursive resolvers could result in less
cache hits. However, the recursive resolvers we distribute our
queries to are some of the most popular, and thus likely have
highly populated caches. Moreover, we actually always issue
queries for the same domain always to the same recursor,
which means that we force less cache pressure onto each
recursor, which can result in a higher cache hit ratio for each
recursor, which, in turn, can lead to faster response times.
Comparing the differences in page load times for the web-
pages that use the most Google-hosted resources, we find
again that page load times are lower with the CDN approach
than with the local resolver, by 6ms in the median case. How-
ever, unlike the top webpages that use Cloudflare resources,
the random approach performs best, with a median page load
time that is 19ms faster than the CDN-based approach. We
note that there is more variance among all three approaches
with the websites that use the most Google resources, which
may explain why the random approach performs the fastest.
Nonetheless, we find that by distributing queries across mul-
tiple resolvers, websites can load faster.
4.3 Lookup and Localization Effects
In this section we explore in further detail the effects
that result in differences in page load time. We first explore
the effects of different D-DNS strategies on DNS lookup
times; then, we explore how D-DNS affects the ability of an
authoritative DNS server to map a client to a nearby CDN
replica.
(a) CDN - Local Resolver. (b) Random - Local Resolver. (c) CDN - Random.
Figure 2: Page load differences for different approaches (Cloudflare).
(a) CDN - Local Resolver. (b) Random - Local Resolver. (c) CDN - Random.
Diff ≥ 1s 0.1s ≤ Diff < 1s 0.03s ≤ Diff < 0.1s -0.03s < Diff < 0.03s -0.1s < Diff ≤ -0.03s -1s < Diff ≤ -0.1s Diff ≤ -1s
Figure 3: Page load differences for different approaches (Google).
4.3.1 DNS Lookup Times
DNS lookup times are an important metric to understand
how different approaches affect page load times. Web pages
typically include many objects (e.g., images, scripts, etc.),
which all must have their domain names resolved to IP ad-
dresses. Previous work has shown that DNS queries can
cause performance bottlenecks on website page loads [26].
Thus, if certain approaches cause clients to query distant
resolvers, then they may observe slower DNS lookup times.
This in turns would cause slower page load times, as the
client’s browser must wait for DNS lookups to finish before
objects can be downloaded. We study query response times
across our approaches with each set of websites.
Figure 5 shows CDFs for differences in DNS response
times with the websites that use the most Cloudflare-hosted
resources. As before, a median that is less than 0ms on the
x-axis is indicated in blue hues and means that the approach
on the left half of the caption is faster than the approach spec-
ified by the right of the caption. Importantly, DNS lookup
time differences are shown in terms of milliseconds. A me-
dian that is greater than 0ms on the x-axis is indicated in
red hues and means that the approach specified by the left
half of the caption is slower than the approach specified by
the right half of the caption. Finally, a median that is close
to 0ms (between -0.3ms and 0.3ms) indicates that a query
for a given domain name from different models performed
similarly.
As with page load times, we find that the CDN approach
outperforms the local resolver for the webpages that include
the most Cloudflare-hosted resources. However, the differ-
ence is negligible, with a median improvement of 0.1ms. We
also find that the random model performs slower than the
local resolver, with a difference of 3ms. These results align
with our expectation that the random approach would result
in longer DNS lookup times. By distributing queries to the
five different resolvers that we measured with, we may get
less cache hits, rather than using a single resolver with a
well-populated cache for all queries.
With the webpages that include the most Google-hosted
resources, we also find that the CDN approach outperforms
the local resolver. As with the CDN approach for Cloudflare-
hosted resource, though, the difference is negligible, with
an improvement of 0.24ms in the median case. The random
(a) CDN - Local Resolver. (b) Random - Local Resolver. (c) CDN - Random.
Figure 4: DNS differences for different approaches (Cloudflare).
(a) CDN - Local Resolver. (b) Random - Local Resolver. (c) CDN - Random.
Diff ≥ 10ms 1ms ≤ Diff < 10ms 0.3ms ≤ Diff < 1ms -0.3ms < Diff < 0.3ms -1ms < Diff ≤ -0.3ms -10ms < Diff ≤ -1ms Diff ≤ -10ms
Figure 5: DNS differences for different approaches (Google).
resolver performs even worse than the local resolver for
Google-hosted resources, with a difference of 5.25ms.
Put together, these results suggest that different ap-
proaches have significantly different effects on query re-
sponse times. By using the CDN approach with a single
CDN resolver, clients may observe few differences in DNS
lookup times. Asmore resolvers are used to distribute queries,
though, lookup times tend to increase. Despite this increase
in lookup times, clients may still be able to download web-
pages with the random approach on par with the local re-
solver, as shown by the results in Section 4.2. DNS lookup
times times do not appear to have a significant effect on page
load times for each approach. Thus, the random approach
remains a feasible option for improving privacy.
4.3.2 Effects on Content Localization
We further investigate how each approach affects web per-
formance by studying the distance to the CDN edge servers
that each approach resolved and used to fetch the objects.
This is particularly important to evaluating the CDN ap-
proach, because, we hypothesize that by distributing queries
for CDN-hosted content to their respective resolvers (Sec-
tion 3), CDNs will be able to better map clients to nearby
edge servers. The CDNs can more accurately map clients to
edge servers based on knowing the locations of their anycast-
based recursive resolvers and edge servers, which is other-
wise difficult without features such as EDNS Client Subnet
(ECS), a feature that some of the most popular recursors
do not support anymore because of privacy concerns. Cor-
respondingly, one way to understand how well CDNs are
mapping clients to nearby edge servers is by measuring the
latency to the servers of CDN-hosted objects that each ap-
proach used.
We compare the localization of CDN-hosted content be-
tween approaches by measuring the client’s latency to the
servers of CDN-hosted resources via ICMP ECHO (ping).
First, we extract the URL and IP address returned for each
CDN-hosted resource across all HARs based on our previous
analysis of what content is hosted on a CDN (Section 4.1.2).
We then ping each IP address five times and take the median
to measure the latency to the server that hosts the resource.
We compare our latency measurements for the resources
that are present on the same website across approaches.
For example, if the image resource identified by the URL
https://cloudflare.com/image.png was present in a HAR
(a) CDN vs. Local Resolver. (b) Random vs. Local Resolver. (c) CDN vs. Random.
Figure 6: Comparison of latencies to the same CDN-hosted resources with different approaches (Cloudflare; random sample of 20% of points).
(a) CDN vs. Local Resolver, (b) Random vs. Local Resolver. (c) CDN vs. Random.
Figure 7: Comparison of latencies to the same CDN-hosted resources with different approaches (Google, random sample of 20% of points).
for the CDN approach and the local resolver, then we would
group the latencies using each approach for further analysis.
Figure 7 shows scatter plots comparing the latency to
shared resources in HARs between approaches. The x-axis
measure latency to a given CDN-hosted resource with the
approach indicated by the x-label. The y-axis measures la-
tency to the same resource with the approach indicated by
the y-label. Put together, these measurements constitute a
data point on the scatter plot, which enables us to compare
how different approaches map our clients edge servers that
differ in distance from our client. The diagonal line repre-
sents the scenario where each approach results in a mapping
to edge servers that are equidistant from our client.
We find that the CDN approach and the random approach
significantly effect the edge servers clients get map to for
Cloudflare-hosted resources. Figure 6a and Figure 6b show
that, when clients use the CDNmodel and the randommodel,
they often get mapped to servers that are closer to the client
than with the local resolver. We note that the difference in
latency is typically within 5ms, but this may be significant to
improve page load times. For example, if clients get mapped
to an edge server with the CDN approach that is 5ms closer
than with the local resolver, then clients may be able to
download dozens of resources more quickly, which adds up
over the course of a page load. Thus, even if the edge server
is only a few milliseconds closer to the client, this saving in
time adds up.
We find different results with the CDN approach and the
random approach for Google-hosted resources. Across any
pair of approaches, we find much fewer outliers in terms
of latencies to edge servers that host a given resource. In-
terestingly, however, the CDN approach does tend to map
clients to edge servers that are further away than with the
random approach. This result coincides with out findings
in Section 4.2, in which page load times with the random
model were slightly slower than with the CDN approach.
Although this result is counter-intuitive at first, we believe
that Google’s recursive resolvers may not be as widely dis-
tributed as other anycast-based resolvers. Thus, if Google
does not use the location of their recursive resolvers to per-
form better mappings, then clients may get mapped to closer
edge servers by using other widely distributed resolvers.
5 Re-Decentralizing DNS in Practice
We have explored how different strategies for distributing
DNS queries across different resolvers affect performance,
ultimately finding that various strategies for distributing
DNS queries across different entities does not have detrimen-
tal effects on performance. In this section, we discuss next
steps towards a full deployment of D-DNS, including the
possible deployment avenues for incorporating distributed
DNS queries with DoH, and various practical considerations,
including privacy considerations, as well as the potential
effects of D-DNS on security (e.g., DNS-based anomaly de-
tection) and content delivery.
5.1 Deployment Considerations
Ultimately, deploying D-DNS requires modifying client
software to distribute queries to different recursive resolvers.
This functionality can be implemented in either the applica-
tion itself or in the stub resolver that is native to the client’s
operating system. Alternatively, a DNS forwarder on the
local network (e.g., at the client’s local resolver, such as in
a home router) could forward DNS queries appropriately.
Currently, some forms of centralized DNS, such as DoH, are
implemented in the browser (e.g., Firefox, Chrome); such
browser functionality could be augmented with the ability
to distribute DNS queries to different recursive resolvers ac-
cording to the types of strategies we introduced in Section 3.
The same type of functionality could be implemented in a
DNS forwarder, such as dnsmasq, as we implemented in the
experiments in Section 4. In these cases, local resolvers could
be augmented to support DoT or DoH functionality, with
queries forwarded to the appropriate resolver depending on
the distribution strategy.
Regardless of where D-DNS is deployed, the local resolver
must know where to forward each DNS query. In the case
of CDN-based distribution, the resolver must maintain a
mapping between each domain name and the corresponding
CDN-based recursive resolver, assuming that the correspond-
ing object is hosted on a CDN. Maintaining this mapping and
distributing it to clients presents a potential challenge; in this
regard, a browser-based deployment of D-DNS may prove to
be more practical, given that browsers are already equipped
to receive updates for various domain name-based lists (e.g.,
safe browsing lists, ad blockers). In contrast, a dnsmasq-based
deployment may prove to be more universal, but updating
domain name mappings may be more complex and difficult
to manage, particularly across heterogeneous devices and
operating systems.
5.2 Improving Privacy with D-DNS
The ability to distribute DNS queries across multiple recur-
sive resolvers can help ensure that no single entity sees the
entirety of a client’s DNS queries. The results from Section 4
demonstrate that distributing DNS queries across multiple
resolvers generally does not significantly harm performance,
and in the case of CDN-based distribution, it can occasionally
even improve page load time. These results demonstrate the
potential to explore a variety of strategies for distributing
DNS queries across resolvers.
We envision that D-DNS could incorporate a variety of
strategies for distributing DNS queries, depending on the
tradeoffs between privacy and performance, including those
described by Arkko et al. [2]. Although various strategies for
distributing DNS queries have been proposed, and this paper
evaluates the feasibility and performance effects of some of
these strategies, the privacy tradeoffs of different strategies
has not yet been studied. For example, randomly distributing
queries across a collection of resolvers might prevent any
one resolver from seeing the entirety of client queries on
the one hand, but over time all resolvers might gain enough
information about client activity to piece together sensitive
information about a client. There are also tradeoffs to con-
sider between the privacy benefits of distributing queries
across different resolvers and potential effects on caching.
Futurework could consider howD-DNS and various strate-
gies for distributing DNS queries could improve privacy by
defending against various privacy attacks, including DNS-
based web fingerprinting and device identification attacks.
5.3 Security, Usability, and Ethics
As DNS becomes both encrypted and decentralized, cer-
tain security tasks may become more challenging. For ex-
ample, many security appliances depend on the ability to
observe unencrypted DNS traffic to detect compromised ma-
chines or other anomalies [1]. The inability to observe a
client’s DNS traffic at a single vantage point may make a
variety of conventional network management tasks, from
device identification to malware detection, more challenging
in the future. Additionally, other appliances, such as parental
controls, rely on the local recursive resolver to filter or redi-
rect traffic (many ISPs implement parental controls at their
resolver, for example).
The proposed use of DNS canary domains may provide an
interim short-term solution for some of these network man-
agement challenges. When a client connects to a network,
they could ask their local resolver for the addresses of one or
more canary domains. The local resolver can then determine
whether the client uses services that depend on the ability to
see DNS queries. If so, the local resolver can send an answer
such as NXDOMAIN as a signal, which could result in the
client disabling D-DNS. Such canary domains are already in
limited use for DoH, for example: Firefox has implemented a
canary domain to disable DNS-over-HTTPS in the presence
of parental controls and malware filters [5]. Unfortunately,
canary domains are fairly coarse-grained: they enable or dis-
able D-DNS (or DoH) completely, without allowing a client
to enable such a service for a subset of domains. Securing
the use of canary domains is also important.
The technical design of DNS resolution is, in fact, a topic
with complicated ethical issues. The introduction of central-
ized DoH, for example, arose out of concerns of user privacy
and ISP surveillance; on the other hand, centralized DoH
introduced new risks associated with security, privacy, and
Internet censorship. For example, among the concerns with
centralized DoH is that it could become a choke point for
data collection, coercion, or censorship by oppressive gov-
ernments; various IETF working groups are discussing hu-
man rights considerations associated with centralized DoH.
Additionally, because the design of DoH and D-DNS have
complicated implications for privacy (i.e., which entities ulti-
mately can see a user’s DNS queries), the settings of defaults
in applications and devices also warrant consideration. For
example, the Android OS currently presents an option for
“Private DNS” to users, which ultimately enables DoT and
sends all DNS queries from a user’s device to Google. Firefox
and Chrome have also been rumored to be experimenting
with the default settings for DoH which could route a large
fraction of user DNS queries to a single centralized entity
with a single software update. Moving forward, the designs
of D-DNS, DoH, and related protocols, as well as their associ-
ated default settings and user interfaces, entail complicated
ethical considerations that likely warrant separate detailed
studies.
5.4 Transport-Layer Optimizations
RFC 8484 recommends that DoH clients and resolvers use
HTTP/2 as the minimum HTTP version to achieve com-
parable performance with Do53 [8]; HTTP/2 may enable
DoH to perform comparably with Do53 through the use of
a technology called server push, which RFC 7520 specifies
as a way for servers to send content to clients before they
request it [14]. In the context of DoH, recursive resolvers
could predict DNS responses that clients might make based
on past DNS requests. In the case of a CDN that serves the
content for the associated DNS names, the CDN may be
able to proactively push DNS responses for DNS names that
are referenced in the web objects that it serves, ultimately
preventing the client from having to make additional DNS
queries. For both security and privacy reasons, it may ulti-
mately make sense for CDN-hosted recursive resolvers to
only be permitted for domains that are associated with the
content that they host (as in the CDN-based distribution
approach described in Section 3).
Such transport-layer optimizations can further improve
the performance of CDN-based distribution in D-DNS. Fur-
thermore, if the CDN-hosted resolver only receives queries
for domains associated with the content that it hosts, the
client need not compromise privacy in exchange for these
performance improvements, since the CDN already knows
that it is serving these objects to the client and thus no ad-
ditional information is leaked by resolving (or pushing) the
associated DNS responses for the client.
6 Conclusion
New technologies such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) are
introducing increasing trends towards centralization of DNS
resolution. In this paper, we present D-DNS, a new client
architecture for interacting with multiple recursive DNS
resolvers to improve web performance and privacy. We im-
plement D-DNS and study performance when selecting dif-
ferent resolvers based on the CDN that hosts content, as well
as simply selecting resolvers at random, comparing those
results to performance achieved using a local resolver. We
measure DNS resolution times and find that the CDN-based
approach performs similarly to a local resolver, while the
random approach offers only slightly worse performance
than relying on a default local resolver. Interestingly, when
studying page load times, we find that both the CDN-based
and random approaches either improve or result in little dif-
ference compared with a local resolver, depending on the
CDN. Ultimately, our findings show that the D-DNS models
we present can improve performance in some cases, and
generally do not negatively affect performance in the worst
case.
Our research demonstrates that the potential privacy
and robustness benefits inherent in distributing DNS traffic
across multiple resolvers can be realized without a signifi-
cant performance penalty, pointing to promising avenues
for future work in performance and privacy enhancements.
To encourage others to build on and extent our results—
including replicating our results, validating them in other
network settings, exploring different strategies for distribut-
ing DNS queries across resolvers, and integrating D-DNS
with other DNS privacy extensions (e.g., DoH, DoT)—we will
publicly release the D-DNS source code and all experiment
code and results.
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